Kampagne für die Reform der Vereinten Nationen
Movement for UN Reform (UNFOR)
SI VIS PACEM PARA PACEM!
If you want peace, prepare for peace!
Unsere Themen und Projekte:
Menschenrechtsklage/Human Rights Complaint
Is Germany actually blocking the development of the UNITED NATIONS to become an effective System of Collective Security?
►►(Click here (German)!)◄◄
by Klaus Schlichtmann
Deutsch lernen in Tokio?
Täglich sterben über einhunderttausend Menschen an Hunger.
·Wie werde ich friedensaktiv ?·
Der Brief war an UN-Generalsekretär Kofi Annan adressiert und wurde vom Forschungsdirektor des Panels, Professor Stephen Stedman, beantwortet. Professor Stedman schrieb uns:
"I would like to thank you for your letter addressed to the Secretary-General, and for the attached report on issues related to the mandate of the High-Level Panel. Your report has been brought to the attention of the members of the High-Level Panel. Thank you for your contribution to the Panel's deliberations."
Movement for UN Reform 2007
Centenary of the Second Hague Peace Conference
»To serve the Peace of the World «
The Secretary General of the United Nations
Mr. Kofi Annan
New York, NY 10017
Nakakayama, 11 September 2004
Respected Sir, dear Mr. Secretary General,
Allow me to introduce myself. I am an independent researcher, and former Chairman of the German NO of the World Federalist Movement from 1980 to 1992. (Please see my VITA attached for further details.)
I have learnt of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, which you have launched, and whose final report is to be submitted in December this year. We would like to take this opportunity, and ask you to consider some of our suggestions listed below. Civil society, individuals and academia should have the opportunity to input into the discussions and deliberations of the Panel, one of whose tasks is finding a formula for the reform of the UN Security Council.
The issues, about which UNFOR 2007 will also make an effort to educate the public in the coming weeks and months, are – in our opinion – absolute priority. UNFOR 2007, which was founded last year, favors a pragmatic, visionary approach, based on already existing international and constitutional law, and peace history. We believe that the text of the UN Charter already contains the basic provisions for making the system work. The Centenary of the Second Hague Peace Conference – though little known the Hague conferences already aimed at replacing the institution of war/national defense with a legal institution (obligatory arbitration) – offers the opportunity for a breakthrough toward achieving binding regulations for global governance.
To begin with, however, we would like to draw your attention to Article 9 of the Japanese ‘Peace Constitution’, and ask you – if possible – to take up the issue and intervene personally to prevent its being revised. Article 9 aims at an effective UN system of Collective Security that should make national defense systems obsolete. If some people in Japan want to revise Article 9, the reason may be that they have given up hope that an international order of peace and justice, as well as general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, can be achieved. We therefore suggest that the war-abolishing clause, Article 9, be seconded in the UN General Assembly and declared a ‘Monument of a Culture of Peace’.
Now, we recommend the following issues to be taken into consideration by the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. (Please see the full INDEPENDENT REPORT, attached, for details.)
(1) Besides the UN Charter, a number of ‘peace provisions’ in national constitutions, which support the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations, are to be taken into account. They are the ‘building blocks’ for establishing an effective system of collective security, and need to be acknowledged as a legal basis toward this end. This issue is closely linked to support for the Japanese Constitution's Article 9.
(2) Transforming so-called defense ministries into Ministries for Peace and Disarmament, or alternatively, establishing Ministries for Peace and Disarmament side by side with existing ministries.
(3) Security Council reform should be achieved in two stages, within a time-frame of five years, starting immediately. We believe that it will not be possible to achieve UN Security Council Reform in a single, comprehensive act. Effective Security Council reform should result in giving the Council a monopoly of power; and the process should be democratic and have the backing of Peoples of the United Nations, which can only be achieved by stages.
(4) Clarify and inform about the issue of Article 106 of the UN Charter, which provides for a.) backing up the disarmament process, once it gets on its way, so that there will be no security gaps, and b.) backing up the process of the UN obtaining the monopoly of power, as envisioned by the United Nations’ founders.
UNFOR 2007 is presently supported, among others, by the following peace academics and activists: Richard Beiderbeck (KOINAE), Dr. Ulrich Decking (PAX CHRISTI), Dr. Manfred Ehmer (author), E. Field Horine (former UN employee), Prof. Dr. Karl Holl (peace historian), Prof. Rikio Kaneko (president, WOCIT), Dr. h.c. Karheinz Koppe (IPRA and Peace Research Information Unit Bonn - PRIUB), Dr. Helmut Kramer (Forum Justizgeschichte), Dr. Karlheinz Lipp (peace historian), Dr. Gerald Mader (Peace Center Burg Schlaining/Austria), Dr. Regine Mehl (Peace Research Information Unit Bonn - PRIUB), Armin von Samson Himmelstjerna (World District Agency, Cité de la Paix), Prof. Dr. Abdul Wahed Sarabi (former Minister of Higher Education and Dean of Faculty, University of Kabul/Afghanistan), Erich Schmidt-Eenboom (Forschungsinstitut für Friedenspolitik), and Chauyen Lai Shrestha (President, Youth Alliance for Development, Secretary-General, International Youth Coordination Council, Nepal).
With sincere regards, I am respectfully yours,
Cc: Dr. Stephen Stedman
By non-state actor
(1) General acknowledgement of the ‘peace stipulations’ in constitutional law as a legal foundation (‘building blocks’), besides the UN Charter, as a basis and starting point for setting up collective security.
- State sovereignty is not “an absolute and immutable principle” (Kofi Annan). National constitutions provide for pooling sovereign powers in favor of a UN System of Collective Security.
- The text of the UN Charter already contains the basic provisions for change and making collective security operative. These provisions in the UN Charter, however, are complemented by and require the support of national basic law, i.e. clauses in constitutions providing for legislative action by lawmakers to transfer sovereign powers pertaining to peace and cooperation to the United Nations. These constitutional provisions, suggesting that national lawmakers can pass legislation to create world law, have been largely overlooked. In fact, as someone pointed out, there has been in the past “no sustained attempt to think through the institutional architecture. On the whole, member states have opted for muddling through.” (David Hannay) By taking all the sources pertaining to collective security into consideration and applying them, the process of the UN obtaining a monopoly of power would be transparent, democratic and effective.
- We know what happens if disarmament does not get on its way. For 50 years after the end of the Second World War Japan has upheld Article 9. Anybody with an understanding of history and international law knows that Article 9 is aiming at a universal system of Collective Security. Unfortunately, because of the Cold War, with the creation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, not ‘collective security’ but ‘collective self-defense’ became the dominant principle, and consequently the UN’s system of Collective Security could not be realized. The very meaning of collective security was forgotten. Now that Collective Security (j., shudanteki anzen hosho) has a chance to become a reality, so that all countries may disarm, some politicians are aiming at collective self defense (j., shudanteki jieiken) and want to change the constitution. This is highly illogical. Which ever way you look at it, history has shown time and again that a balance of power system based on alliances and principles of self-defense cannot guarantee international peace and security in the long run. (See book reviews on the Japanese Constitution and Art. 9 at http://www.ne.jp/asahi/peace/unitednationsreform2007/bookreviews.html . Also see the list of constitutional provisions that support UN Collective Security at
(2) Transforming so-called defense ministries into Ministries for Peace and Disarmament, or alternatively, establishing Ministries for Peace and Disarmament side by side with existing ministries.
- An announcement by UN member states to this effect would have great public appeal. For an argument favoring the transformation of so-called defense ministries into Ministries for Peace and Disarmament, or alternatively establishing Ministries for Peace and Disarmament side by side with existing defense ministries see
- European countries like Italy and Germany might well take up this idea if the United Nations is strengthened accordingly. Then, if and when real disarmament including nuclear disarmament gets on its way worldwide, the permanent members of the Security Council, and “as occasion requires ... other Members of the United Nations” (see Article 106 of the UN Charter) such as Japan, India etc. will back up the disarmament process to ensure that this will not diminish international security.
(3) Security Council reform should be achieved in two stages, within a time-frame of five years, starting immediately.
- The present institution of the Permanent Members is, according to the Charter, part and parcel of the Transitional Security Arrangements of Chapter XVII. Anyway, it will not be possible to achieve UN Security Council Reform in a single sweeping act, or in one step. We are convinced that Security Council reform will fail if it does not result in giving the Council the monopoly of power, and if the process is not democratic, i.e. if it does not have the backing of Peoples of the United Nations. In our TWO-STAGE APPROACH, the first stage requires only minimal changes in the text of the UN Charter, while at the same time already making the UN much more democratic and the Security Council much more representative. This could be achieved by establishing an advisory CIVIL SOCIETY COUNCIL under Article 22 of the UN Charter, and making a prominent member of the Global South, INDIA, a permanent member of the Security Council, preferably already in the forthcoming session of the UNGA. See the article at http://www.ne.jp/asahi/peace/unitednationsreform2007/UN_Campaign_2007/Dokument2/indiaquest.html ! (The revised article was published in GANDHI MARG, vol. 26, no. 1, April-June 2004.)
- Members, who are willing to pass legislation delegating powers to the UNSC, should give India the task of initiating “negotiations … on … nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” (Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty). This would be the first and decisive step towards finding “an appropriate balance at a global level” (see High Level Panel, ‘The Terms of Reference’).
- Comprehensive UN and Security Council Reform should be undertaken after five years and could give permanent representation to the EU, Japan, the Arab League, South Africa and Brazil as well as increase the number of non-permanent members. UNFOR 2007 also favors a World Constituent Assembly for the year 2010.
(4) Clarify and inform about the issue of Article 106 of the UN Charter, which provides for a.) backing up the disarmament process, once it gets on its way, so that there will be no security gaps, and b.) backing up the process of the UN obtaining the monopoly of power, as its founders envisioned.
- It has been stated that Article 106 of the Charter had become “obsolete” (Rudolf Geiger, ‘Article 26’, The United Nations Charter: a commentary, Oxford University Press, 2002). However, the only traceable source for this obviously mistaken notion is the statement by a Swedish delegate at the 1569th meeting of the Sixth Committee in November 1975 [G A (30), 6th Comm., 1569th mtg., para. 19].
- The reluctance of member states to initiate a process of pooling sovereign powers with the United Nations, and invoking Article 106 of the Charter for the purpose, to enable the Security Council “to begin the exercise of its responsibilities” and move a way from mere ‘ad-hoc coalitions’ and arrangements, may be one reason why the United States is “still undecided on whether the United Nations can be meaningfully updated.” The “opportunity to strengthen the United Nations to equip it for the peace and security threats of today and the future” (Richard H. Stanley) and create an effective “architecture of international security” (Kofi Annan), must not be wasted.
- There is no doubt in our mind that the government of the United States of America and governments of the other Permanent Members of the Security Council will stand by their commitment under Article 106 of the UN Charter.
Generally speaking, (the following is an excerpt from the author’s submission to the Panel of Eminent Persons on Civil Society, sent on or before 1 October 2003) “there is no reason why individual nation states should not submit to the same principles and regulations as the states and departments in a federal republic or state or other communities under the rule of law, equipped with legislative, judicial and enforcement powers. That nation states think they can be exempt from such binding controls that would ensure effective global governance, is an anachronism. … [governments should be encouraged] to make the necessary political decisions and take the necessary steps towards strengthening global governance and legal institutions, with the aim of reducing nation states’ reliance on military deterrence and military conflict resolution, to be able to eventually disarm completely. … The often negative impact of ‘globalization … on democracy and inter-governmental processes’ and ‘the lack of public trust in the processes and institutions of global governance today’ (Contextual paper, Summary of First Meeting, June 2-3, 2003, New York) are clear signs of this deficit (see above). If the aims ‘to make the United Nations a more effective instrument,’ and enhancing its actual ‘capability for collective action’ (A/57/387 of 9 September 2002) are to be realized, informed ‘policy deliberation at national and international levels’ (Modes of UN-civil society engagement, ibid.) are needed, concerning the issue of nation states submitting to the same principles and rules as the states in a federation. A fresh, creative interpretation and application of the UN system and principle of Collective Security is overdue.”
Indeed, as the Secretary General has stressed, the United Nations has “made significant improvements in [its] capacity to deploy and manage complex peacekeeping and peace-building operations”. This may be an indication that it is now safe – and propitious – to put the system of collective security envisaged in the UN Charter into effect.
Political Correspondence concerning the Delegation of
Powers to the Security Council 1983-1999
The German World Federalists (Weltföderalisten Deutschlands e.V. - WFD) took the initiative for the first time in 1983 when they approached political parties, the Foreign Ministry and the German Government. Initially the aim was, to empower the UN Security Council to implement measures for disarmament, by transferring to it the question of the deployment of new medium range Pershing 2 missiles and Cruise Missiles on German territory. The proposal drew some attention in Bonn at the time and we were invited to the capital, to discuss the matter with a representative of the Foreign Ministry, which at the time was in the hands of the Liberal Democratic Party (F.D.P.).
The F.D.P.’s vice chairman in a long letter commented on the Draft Bill proposal for the “Delegation to the Security Council of sovereign powers involving the deployment of new American missiles” on German territory. He admitted that ‘in the age of excessive nuclear armaments and economic interdependence … the insistence on traditional national sovereignty in international law and politics is essentially an anachronism’. ‘International cooperation as well as international and supranational levels of control and decision-making ’ were ‘necessary’. The German Constitution’s Article 24 GG we drew on did in his opinion indeed form ‘the basis for the delegation of sovereign powers by law,’ and insofar our proposed way was ‘legally possible, [and] in accordance with the basic law’. Also, the Constitution ‘determined the general rules of international law to be a part of federal law.’ They ‘precede domestic laws’ and “create rights and duties directly binding upon the inhabitants of the Federal Republic” (Article 25). Furthermore, Article 26 prohibits all “actions, which are designed and undertaken with the intention to disturb the peaceful coexistence of peoples...” Therefore, the delegation of sovereign powers could ‘take place insofar as the aims, purposes and concrete actions were in accordance with these provisions.’ Nevertheless, the high-ranking F.D.P. politician said, ‘although the idea was attractive,' he was not able ‘to support such an initiative,’ because in his opinion our proposal could ‘not lead up to the political goal of “a balance in armaments at a lower level.” (Uwe Ronneburger, 26 September 1983)
Seeking to put the quest also to political scientists, peace researchers and international lawyers, we asked the opinion of Professor Volker Rittberger, who was then teaching at the Institute of Political Sciences at the University of Tübingen. Professor Rittberger replied that he thought ‘the proposal [was] very interesting’ and, ‘although at present I see no chances of its realization, it should be examined for its political implications. Only if you will take these into consideration, and opposition against such regulation of delegating sovereign powers [to the UNSC] can be identified, would your undertaking have any chances of success.’ (4 October 1983)
From the Personal Bureau of Willy Brandt, of the Social Democratic Party that was in the opposition at the time, came the following reply: ‘Mr Brandt has asked me to thank you for sending us the draft bill for delegating sovereign powers to the Security Council of the United Nations.’ Willy Brandt has asked ‘the working groups in charge of the SPD-faktion in the Parliament (Bundestag), to seriously consider such a suggestion’ and confirmed, that ‘Article 24 of the Basic Law provides a handle for relinquishing sovereign powers in favour of a system of collective security. In view of the declaration in the Constitution to serve the peace of the world, it would be logical to reject any [military] block formations in favor of a collective security system in Europe and the world.’ However, he thought it was necessary to take into account the ‘decisive problem’, i.e. to ‘bring about a collective renunciation, in order to avoid a security vacuum for individual countries who are willing to give up [their individual right of belligerency]. It was thanks to the German World Federalists, to have ‘come closer to this goal.’ (25 October 1983) What the bureau apparently did not know at the time, was that the UN Charter already provided safety measures for this event by stipulating that in the period of 'transition’, during which the United Nations obtains a monopoly of power, as originally envisaged by its founders, the permanent members (and, “as occasion requires … other Members of the United Nations”) are to back up the process guaranteeing the peaceful transition (Article 106).
The Working Group I of the SPD, too, confirmed on 16 November 1984, that the Party would stand by its judgment that the ‘proposal in the Basic Law showed a meaningful way,’ but was ‘nevertheless presently not yet in a position, to introduce a respective bill,’ because ‘at this time (it would have) no chance of getting a meaningful parliamentary hearing.’ (AK I SPD, 16.11.84)
The GREENS which had only recently joined Parliament were much more sceptical. They said that the ‘delegation of sovereign powers to the UN Security Council [we] propagate as a peace-making element’ was with the GREENS ‘not at all consensus…’ Although relinquishing sovereign powers ‘could be supported, if in place of national egotisms a system of collective securing of peace (Friedenssicherung)’ was put in its place, the writer criticised our ‘attempt of trying to achieve in a short cut as it were by legalistic ways and means, what [in his] opinion could only be he result of a long-term, slowly evolving change in (political) consciousness’ and he quoted from the Women’s Independent Peace Movement in the GDR: “Disarmament begins in the head.” Our initiative was, ‘in the language of “Realpolitik“! – ahead of its time’ and also ahead of ‘the discussions within the GREEN Party’ (Bureau Petra Kelly, 31. Mai 1985)
A ray of hope was the letter by Nobel Prize laureate Jan Tinbergen, who wrote us on 4 June 1985 distinctly: ‘I think it is an excellent idea to have transferred security sovereignty from national governments to the Security Council of the United Nations. Your example should be followed by all other governments.’ The Social Democrat Tinbergen welcomed the positive attitude of the SPD in this question. Indeed, again on 10 September the Foreign Committee of the Party dealt ‘with the issue [we] addressed, of delegating sovereign powers to the United Nations,’ commenting: ‘Not least because a number of leading members of our party are also members in the German UNA and are speaking in favor of strengthening the United Nations, we are positively disposed towards the basic idea (presented in) your deliberations.’ However, ‘in view of the existing power constellation in parliament … presently [the SPD saw] no chance of a positive parliamentary treatment [of our] concrete proposal.’ (Foreign Committee, SPD, 10 September 1985)
It went on like that. In May the following year, Professor Kurt Biedenkopf, who later became Chief Minister of the Federal German state of Saxonia, acknowledged in response to our “Statement on Pooling ‘Security Sovereignty’ with the United Nations” that we had ‘taken up an interesting initiative with this proposal.’ (Kurt Biedenkopf, 5 May 1986) In the beginning of December the same year Norwegian peace researcher Professor Johann Galtung informed us (writing in German): ‘I am thinking in the same direction.’ (Galtung, 8.12.86)
Professor Hieronim Kubiak, President of the Polish Peace Committee, who had also the same year participated with us in the Copenhagen Peace Congress, wrote us on 9 December 1987: ‘I have found your paper (“Pooling Security Sovereignty with the United Nations”) interesting and full of historical exemplifications backing your reasoning.’ They were moving times, in which the international movement of the world federalists under the leadership of the Dane Dr. Hermod Lannung maintained contacts to many East European and Communist ‘colleagues’, with whom they kept up a dialogue for peace and understanding.
The Working Group I of the Social Democratic Party in the German ‘Bundestag’ wrote us again on 6 January 1988: ‘An initiative in the sense you have proposed has so far not been seriously [!] considered by us. With the present political constellation in the world the Security Council of the United Nations would in our view surely be overtaxed, if it would be charged with an extra burden of new responsibilities, as you suggest. This could easily result in discrediting the United Nations as a whole.’ Had the constitutional provision stipulating that lawmakers take concrete action for peace in the meantime been forgotten? Sure: ‘If it is right to strengthen the institution of the United Nations in the long term, political good sense nevertheless would suggest waiting for the respective, correct moment. Only in a broad, worldwide consensus could such restructuring of international responsibilities be realized.’ Obviously, everything depends on seizing the right moment!
The Berlin Wall tumbles, but nothing happens. The nuclear physician and peace researcher Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker professes: ‘I just want to tell you, that I principally find the aims you stand for to be exactly the right aims. Of course, how this is carried out in detail is continually anew a question of concrete politics.’ (31 January 1991) Did he mean that the aims were o.k., but not the means?
Meanwhile, the Foreign Office was ‘very thoroughly also dealing with institutional questions of the UN’ and ‘therefore quite grateful for suggestions and “unsolicited advice”,’ being in spring 1991 of the opinion that ‘the instruments of the United Nations (should) be strengthened’ (Bureau Hans-Dietrich Genscher, 18 March 1991). And the renowned authority on international law, Professor Otto Kimminich certified us once more in December: ‘You are quite right that Article 24 GG presents a handle for transferring responsibilities to the UN, which so far were subject to the sovereignty of the nation state. According to German constitutional law I suppose such a delegation/transfer would have to take place in the form of a law/bill. Again you are quite right, when you say that fort his purpose parliament (the Bundestag) could pass a law with simple majority.’ (16 December 1991) On the same issue Karsten Voigt, the SPD’s foreign policy spokesman wrote: ‘I have noted with satisfaction that central considerations of your association [Weltföderalisten Deutschlands e.V.] coincide with the ideas and aims of the Social Democratic Party.’ (Voigt, 22 June 1992)
Also, following the Foreign Ministry’s assertion that it might heed our “unsolicited advice” (we had used the English term in our correspondence), German World Federalists had suggested, prior to the unilateral diplomatic recognition of some of the newly formed East European states, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia etc., that this be made conditional on their recognizing the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as compulsory, and making a declaration to the effect, under Article 36, para. 2 of the ICJ’s Statute. This, flanked by an appropriate policy of strengthening the United Nations, could have averted perhaps much of the violent conflicts that later ensued. Unfortunately this time there was no response to our “unsolicited advice”. In 1992 official activities of the chair of the German World Federalist Association came to an end, and there are only some occasional, sporadic communications and utterances:
‘Your suggestions and reflections on the reform of the United Nations are very interesting.’ (Chief Committee II, Foreign Policy Department of the Christian Democratic Union, Federal Office, Bonn, 9 July 1996)
Finally, the expert legal opinion of the renowned international jurist and advisor to the Foreign Ministry, Professor Knut Ipsen was sought, concerning the question whether the members of the United Nations had in fact already transferred powers to the Security Council. ‘I am not of the opinion that [member] states have already transferred primary responsibility fort he maintenance of international peace and security to the Security Council in the sense of a delegation of sovereign powers. Something like this would assume that the states insofar have regularly discharged a competence existing until that time from their own competence realm and tossed it toward the UN.’ (Professor Knut Ipsen, Law Faculty, Chair of Public Law [International Law], Ruhr-University Bochum, 13 April 1999)
Last but not least, Günter Verheugen in a letter to the former chairman of the German World Federalists, wrote: ‘With great sympathy I acknowledge your thought provoking initiative. Let me first, however, set something right: I have not spoken against a European [permanent] representation in the UN Security Council. I am of the opinion, that this would be of great benefit to further integration in Europe, and would both correspond more adequately to today’s constellation of states and the progress in integration achieved so far. ... With you I am convinced that progressive legal regulation (Verrechtlichung) and civilization of international relations are required. At the same time we have to recognize the conflict existing in the relation between ‘might and right’ as a given condition, the overcoming of which is a positive utopia in the sense that we have to work persistently toward it. ... The threefold reform task – institutionally, in international law and in the sense of a global social conception of political responsibility – must be resolutely pursued, especially by those states which, due to their recent history, are in a favorable position to try an innovative approach in the field of international relations. Among them is also the Federal Republic of Germany.’ (22 April 1999)
フリードリッヒ • ニーチェ:
Human, All too Human
284 The means to real peace. -
No government nowadays admits that it maintains an army so as to satisfy occasional thirsts for conquest; the army is supposed to be for defence. That morality which sanctions self-protection is called upon to be its advocate. But that means to reserve morality to oneself and to accuse one‘s neighbour of immorality, since he has to be thought of as ready for aggression and conquest if our own state is obliged to take thought of means of self-defence; moreover, when our neighbour denies any thirst for aggression just as heatedly as our State does, and protests that he too maintains an army only for reasons of legitimate self-defence, our declaration of why we require an army declares our neighbour a hypocrite and cunning criminal who would be only too happy to pounce upon a harmless and unprepared victim and subdue him without a struggle. This is how all states now confront one another: they presuppose an evil disposition in their neighbour and a benevolent disposition in themselves. This presupposition, however, is a piece of inhumanity as bad as, if not worse than, a war would be; indeed, fundamentally it already constitutes an invitation to and cause of wars, because, as aforesaid, it imputes immorality to one‘s neighbour and thereby seems to provoke hostility and hostile acts on his part. The doctrine of the army as a means of self-defence must be renounced just as completely as the thirst for conquest. And perhaps there will come a great day on which a nation distinguished for wars and victories and for the highest development of military discipline and thinking, and accustomed to making the heaviest sacrifices on behalf of these things, will cry of its own free will: ,we shall shatter the sword‘ - and demolish its entire military machine down to its last foundations. To disarm while being the best armed, out of anelevation of sensibility - that is the means to real peace, which must always rest on a disposition for peace: whereas the so-called armed peace such as now parades about in every country is a disposition to fractiousness which trusts neither itself nor its neighbour and fails to lay down its arms half out of hatred, half out of fear. Better to perish than to hate and fear, and twofold better to perish than to make oneself hated and feared - this must one day become the supreme maxim of every individual state! - As is well known, our liberal representatives of the people lack the time to reflect on the nature of man: otherwise they would know that they labour in vain when they work for a ,gradual reduction of the military burden‘. On the contrary, it is only when this kind of distress is at its greatest that the only kind of god that can help here will be closest at hand. The tree of the glory of war can be destroyed only at a single stroke, by a lightning-bolt: lightning, however, as you well know, comes out of a cloud and from on high. (R.J. Hollingdale, transl., Human, All Too Human. A Book for Free Spirits, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (1996), pp. 380-81)